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INTRODUCTION 
AT THE CONCLUSION of his speech delivered at the last meeting of 
the American Association of Law Schools, Nobel laureate George Wald1 
offered an allegory. The dinosaur, he noted, seemed superbly suited, 
to survival in the Mesozoic era because of its size, strength, and tough-
ness of hide. The brain-weight to body-weight ratio of this great brute, 
however, was very low. Compared to the dinosaur, the small warm-
blooded mammals which later appeared on the scene seemed very puny 
indeed. With their sensitive and vulnerable skins and their lack of 
strength and natural weaponry, they hardly seemed candidates for survi-
val under the hostile conditions which then existed. Significantly, how-
ever, these small creatures possessed a higher brain-weight to body-
weight ratio than the dinosaur. We are all aware of the evolutionary 
outcome: the dinosaur, with its low ratio, became extinct; the warm-
blooded mammal, man included, survived in spite of the odds against 
him. It appears, Dr. Wald suggested, that the differences in outcome 
were attributable to the differences in ratio. Recently, however, man 
entered the automobile and made it virtually a part of himself. In con-
sequence, the ratio of man's brain-weight to his machine-body-weight 
has dropped considerably, perhaps to the low level of the dinosaur. The 
implications are obvious. 
If the implications are taken seriously,2 man's major task is to cir-
cumvent the inherent physical limitation on his brain-weight to body-
weight ratio and to increase substantially the total amount and ef-
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1. Professor of Biology, Harvard University, Science and Technology: The Chal-
lenge to Social, Political and Legal Institutions, Association of American Law Schools, 
1970 PROCEEDINGS (pt. 2) 59. 
2. The implications are more serious if brain power is compared with the weight 
and power of all the instruments man now commands to extend his physical power. 
All man's machines and power sources, including nuclear power, would then have to 
be considered. 
1 
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fectiveness of brain power that can be applied to man's survival. 3 
The very recent past affords little reason to expect that such an in-
crease in brain power can be marshalled or, if it can, that it will suc-
ceed in securing our survival. 4 Man has imposed fantastically durable 
constraints upon his own ability to solve the problems that threaten 
his survival. Yet, no purpose is served in adopting a defeatist attitude. 
Those concerned about the future have no choice but to tum their atten-
tion to the removal of those constraints and to the solution of the 
problems. 
This article will suggest contributions that law schools, which claim 
some skill at enhancing brain power, might make to ensure man's sur-
vival, or at least, to enhance the quality of his existence until he ex-
tinguishes himself. 
I. THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
On one count American legal education has been· a great success; 
on two counts it has achieved substantial although not unqualified suc-
cess; and on a fourth count it has proved a dismal failure. 
The law school's greatest success has been in providing adequate, 
often superb, legal services to all those who could afford them. Thus 
law schools have demonstrated the viability of the free market. 5 Con-
comitantly, law school curricula have reflected economic supply and 
demand, offering the knowledge and skills necessary for legal services 
in fee-producing areas but, until recently, giving scant attention to the 
legal services needed by individuals and groups with inadequate re-
sources to pay for them. 6 Notwithstanding many complaints about le-
gal education, the free market for lawyers has provided the legal know-
how necessary to build the world's most affluent and productive in-
3. Increased brain power is a product of increasing the effectiveness of the 
individual brain. This may be accomplished by improvements in education and train-
ing, aided by computers, by marshalling more brains to work on the problem, and 
perhaps by developments from on-going research in genetics. 
4. See A. SZENT-GYORGI, TIm CRAZY APE (1970); Szent-Gyorgi, 15 Minutes 
to Zero, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1970, at 41, col. 4; Feld, The Stake at SALT -Survival, 
id., Dec. 9, 1970, at 35, col. 4; id., Nov. 19, 1970, at 22, col. 4; Barnes, Crisis of Sur-
vival, Ohio State Lantern, Jan. 6, 1971, at 4, col. 3; Cole, Can the World Be Saved?, 
18 BIOSCIENCE 679 (1968). But see Bendiner, A Word for Science, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 15, 1971, at 23, col. 1; Macomber, Purdue President Wonders About Problems 
of 2069, Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 23, 1970, at 3A, col. 1. 
5. Cf. M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS, chs. 2, 3, 8 passim (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
MAYER]; Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 
637, 651 (1968). 
6. Of course, the skills and substance imparted by the law schools were necessary 
for lawyers serving indigent clients. However, the formulation of the curriculum as 
a whole and the content of specific courses, was not addressed to the needs of those 
who could not afford legal services. The most widely cited example was the num-
ber of courses in "creditor's rights" while few law schools had "debtor's rights" courses. 
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dtistrial state. Although some view this as a mixed blessing, or even a 
curse,7 it has been no mean achievement. 
On the second count, the law schools have produced an impressive 
humber of graduates ready and able to serve a wide variety of im-
portant causes which are not fee-producing and which may be person-
ally hazardous.s Few professions other than the clergy can match the 
willingness of lawyers to devote substantial time and expertise to reme-
dying sodetal wrongs and lending assistance to charitable enterprise. As 
a'corollary of the market system, however, the effort expended in such 
noble endeavors has been insignificant compared to the need for such 
legal services.9 Adequate services still depend largely on subsidies which 
have been insufficient so far. Nevertheless, the law schools played a 
commendable role in encouraging public-spiritedness in their graduates; 
law may be a' profession with special responsibilities, but there is no 
reason why an individuai lawyer should deem himself under a greater 
obligation to render free services, than a member of any other calling.10 
'Thirdly, the law 'schools have created a marvelously superior 
system for sharpening the intellect and developing skills of analysis and 
reasoning. To quote Bayless Manning: , 
, We of the legal profession have a reputation, which in my judg-
ment is deserved, for possessing a special capacity for dispassion-
ate analysis, a clear-eyed regard for the facts, an open-minded will-
ingness to look at a problem from every side, a human historical 
,perspective that enables us to perceive problems in their full con-
text, a nose for detecting trouble in advance, and a talent as con-
ceptual architects to design imaginative adaptations to head it off.11 
Training which produces such a reputation for those exposed to it 
must be deemed a triumph12-particularly so, some law teachers like 
to think, when compared with the soggy-headed thinking often pro-
duced in some other academic disciplines. Unfortunately, the tri-
umph is marred by the vast number of law graduates who contribute 
7.SeeC. REICH, THE GREENING· OF AMERICA passim (1970); H. MARCUSE, AN 
EsSAY ON LIBERATION' passim (1969). 
8. See MAYER 21. Some of the work for the civil rights movement in the South 
irivolved hazards for the participantS. 
9. See MAYER ch. 8.' 
10. Perhaps some lawyers take Professor Harry Jones' admonition as part of their 
professional obligation: "A lawyer, a real lawyer, should react to unfairness, inequal-
ity or abusive 'procedure' asa bishop reacts to heresay or a painter to a meretricious 
composition.;', AsSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1963 PROCEEDINGS (pt. 2) 17. 
11. - Mannmg, Introduction:' New Tasks for Lawyers, in LAW IN A CHANGING 
AMERICA ell (G. Hazard ed. 1968). Not everyone has been so charitable: "If you 
think that you can think about a thing inextricably attached to something else with-
out thinking of the thing it is attached to, then you have a legal mind." This remark 
was -attributed to- Professor. Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School in T. 
ARNow, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT, iOI (1937). 
12. , "What the law professors offer in their courses is the best quality of education 
m America." MAYER 118. -
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nothing to this fine reputation, but only ride the coattails of those who 
do; there must be literally thousands of victims of the law who have not 
received justice because of lawyer failures. 
Finally, the American law school has failed to turn its attention 
adequately to the effects on real people of the same legal rules and le-
gal institutions whose operations it has passed on so assiduously to gen-
eration after generation of law students. Ralph Nader stated it suc-
cinctly: "Great questions went unasked, and therefore unanswered. "13 
This failure was compounded by virtually ignoring that law-trained 
persons consistently dominate the major decision-making agencies of 
our society, the very agencies which might have dealt effectively with 
negative legal effects. 14 
How can it be that more than one hundred years since the death of 
Charles Dickens many of our lower courts, jails and prisons, located 
in communities close to leading law schools, still resemble mutatis mu-
tandis the chambers of delay, deprivation, and depravity he depicted 
in nineteenth century England?15 How can it be that private and pub-
lic decision-making institutions in so affluent a society have failed to 
eliminate hunger, poverty, and slums, to end racism, to compensate ac-
cident and disease victims, to control the instruments of war, to pre-
serve peace, to conserve our natural resources and, in general, to pre-
vent serious threats to our existence and its quality? How can this be, 
given the vast numbers of lawyers with the ability to "perceive prob-
lems in their full context, a nose for detecting trouble in advance, and 
a talent as conceptual architects to design imaginative adaptations to 
head it off"?16 
Part of the answer is inherent in the market system: law schools 
have trained lawyers principally to serve paying clients.17 Few of 
the victims of the social problems mentioned have been able to organize 
13. Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, 54 MINN. L. REV. 493, 496 (1970). 
14. MAYER 11-12: "Twenty-three of the thirty·six presidents have been lawyers, 
and half of the governors elected since the Civil War; and lawyers account con-
sistently for about 60 percent of the U.S. Senators and Representatives." Of 
course, lawyers also account for a very high percentage of the policy-makers in most 
agencies at all levels of local, state and federal government. 
15. See Tapp, Book Review, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1333 (1970). Discouragingly, 
the following statement, made by a distinguished law professor in 1932, is almost as 
applicable today: 
There is scarcely a phase of American penal administration which is worthy of 
civilized population. A few of the larger American law schools should at once 
offer comprehensive training in criminology and penology and simultaneously 
assume responsibility for a vigorous and sustained campaign for the placing of 
their graduates in responsible positions of criminal and penal administration. 
Hanna, The Law School as a Function 0/ the University. 10 N.C.L. REV. 117, 152 
(1932). 
16. Manning, supra note 11, at p. 11. 
17. See Nader, supra note 13, at 494-95. This tendency was also noted and dis-
approved earlier by a less controversial figure, Professor Sidney Post Simpson. Simp-
son, The Function of the University Law School, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1068, 1083 (1936). 
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effectively to hire the services of adequately trained advocates.18 Con-
sequently, training to deal explicitly with these problems has been sparse. 
Even when counsel were retained by government or other groups, they 
retained too few, paid them too little or, as in the case of federal ad-
ministrative agencies,19 permitted them to forget whom they were rep-
resenting. 
Arguably, problems of this dimension and complexity will not yield 
to the rational skills of the lawyer. The arguments are familiar and not 
without cogency: these problems are political, not legal;20 profound dis-
agreements about values and differences in "consciousness" prevent 
resolution by rational or traditional legal processes;21 lawyers are not 
omnicompetent. 22 The law and the legally trained are, however, ca-
pable of affecting politics and consciousness; the people do not form their 
views and their prejudices uninfluenced by leaders and institutions. 
Since many leaders are lawyers and most important institutions are con-
trolled by lawyers, law schools constitute a proper arena for confronting 
these problems. Moreover, no acceptable alternative23 exists except for 
law schools to try to help. If the serious problems remain unresolved, 
the democratic institutions and values we cherish may be doomed.24 
18. Since most of the "victims" of social problems are ordinary citizens, the 
corollary has to be that the democratic process has been subverted. If it has not been 
subverted, then why do the people need advocates other than their elected officials? 
19. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMMISSION-THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC (The Ralph Nader Study Group Report on the Interstate 
Commerce Commission 1970). 
20. See C. Black, Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present Day, 79 YALE L.J. 
505, 509 (1970): 
[Tlhe lawyer can see that the culture in which he lives, and in which his law must 
grow or not grow at all, is light-years from being ready to put forth the kind of 
effort and sacrifice it would take to give relief against the injustice of poverty. I 
have implied that a decent living ought to be a civil right. With this concept, if 
the society workingly accepted it, lawyers could deal. But the society does not 
accept it, does not show signs of beginning to accept it, and the lawyer who would 
mould it into the shape of law feels no clay coming into his hands. 
See also Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 1153, 1176-78 (1970). 
21. See C. REICH, supra note 7, passim; Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal 
Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444 (1970). See also Jaffe, Forum: Points of Rebellion, 
37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 11-15 (1970). 
22. Cf. C. Black, supra note 20, at 509-11. 
23. Neither revolution, ii la the New Left, nor awaiting a Consciousness ill con-
sensus, ci la Reich, seems to be a palatable or realistic strategy for dealing with our 
problems. 
24. See generally authorities cited in note 4 supra. See also Gross, Can It Hap-
pen Here?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1971 at 31, col. 4. 
Even Professor Black, wary of turning law schools into "agencies of social action, 
with emphasis not so much on keen thought and research as on the present relief of 
misery," urged that law schools should 
make a start toward applying the reason of the law, its highest and most inclusive 
reason, to the claim of the poor, ... and beginning the work of projecting a ra-
tional system in which the claim not to be poor, in a rich society, shall seem as 
natural as the claim not to be beaten up in a society which has the means to keep 
order. . . . [This work should be donel without bias or preconception, except for 
the lawyer's bias in favor of that justice which must be done lest the heavens fall 
upon our children. 
C. Black, supra note 20, at 510, 511 (emphasis added). 
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From this perspective, the past failure of the law schools to break out 
of the market system and to confront these problems-problems of the 
effects and effectiveness of law and legal institutions-constitutes a 
failure of cosmic proportions. 
n. THE RESTRUCTURING OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
Legal education can be restructured to provide the legal resources 
to deal with the problems mentioned above. A few disclaimers, how-
ever, are in order: 
First, with respect to existing law schools, no program could pos-
sibly succeed which undermines the training of lawyers to meet the exist-
ing demand for traditional legal services. Therefore, all proposals are 
framed to avoid weakening the training of practitioners or forcing un-
willing faculty or students into the programs that are recommended. 
Nor is the development of the skills of intellect which already set the 
lawyer apart weakened. 
Second, no great benefit will accrue by creating special law schools 
to train policymakers.25 Although the complexity of legal problems 
may soon require specialization by law schools,26 categories of speciali-
zation should be substantive subject matter areas, such as tax and eco-
nomic relations, property and housing, accident and health, transporta-
tion, transnational legal relations, or regional problems. 27 Since each 
area embraces important policy problems, future policymakers would 
emerge from each institution despite its specialization and regardless of 
its excellence. Therefore, confining the training of policymakers to 
special schools would not only be inadequate, but also would tend to 
undermine the democratization by which all kinds of law students from 
all kinds of law schools are drawn into the structure of community de-
cision making.28 
25. A special law school for training policy makers may have been recom-
mended for Brandeis University by its former President, Morris Abram. See Inter-
view with Morris Abram, Educating the Lawyer As a Policy-maker, 6 TRIAL, April/May 
1970) at 41. Mr. Abrams purported to describe an accredited law school which 
would tum out graduates capable of practicing law. The" projected size of the school 
(50 students per class), however, and the extent of planned concentration on policy 
training suggested, to some, a rather elitist school for decision makers. Mr. Abrams 
was probably misunderstood. See also ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw SCHOOLS, 1966 
PROCEEDINGS (pt. 1), Report of Curriculum Committee 39-43. 
26. See Goldstein, The Unfulfilled Promise of Legal Education, LAW IN A CHANG-
ING AMERICA 157, 162-63 (G. Hazard ed. 1968). Johnstone, Student Discontent and 
Educational Reform in the Law Schools, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 255, 257-64 (1970). 
27. Obviously there would be much overlap in the courses taken in such schools. 
Each course would, however, where feasible, concentrate on issues relevant to the area 
of specialization. 
Other kinds of specialization which have been proposed include training for gen-
eral practice in small communities, training for corporate practice, and training for 
poverty law. Cf. Jones, Local Law Schools vs. National Law Schools: A Comparison 
of Concepts, Functions, and Opportunities, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 281 (1958). 
28. The dangers of elitism are nowhere more evident than in Professor John 
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Third, as will be seen, the ideas proposed draw heavily on the 
prior efforts of others.29 For some of the earlier ideas, the time may 
have come. What follows is basically a new score with variations on 
an old theme. 
Essentially, the broad problem is fashioning significant decision-
making agencies, governmental and nongovernmental, with both the 
will and the ability to serve society effectively. Although most agree 
that the sum of these goals is human dignity, a primary task is to identify 
specifically their content in each problem area. Next, strategies most 
likely to achieve these goals must be found. Before those strategies can 
be implemented, however, the constraints which prevent effective imple-
mentation must be removed. This task is clearly the most unyielding 
and difficult one facing the world today: there seems to be no way for 
decision makers to break out of the narrow and unreasonable constraints 
imposed upon them by a host of factors-historical, cultural, political, 
economic and social.30 Thus, imaginative and potentially successful 
programs for dealing with poverty and urban blight are doomed in ad-
vance to failure because of· inability to allocate sufficient resources. Ef-
fective accident and health programs are certain to be sabotaged by 
interest groups whose great influence is not counterbalanced by groups 
advocating the public interest. Arrangements to achieve peace never 
leave the drawing board because of unrealistic historical perspectives, 
widespread parochialism; and infectious mistrust. We may have become 
a society which reacts to most of its problems with circumlocution, if not 
doublethink, and with half measures designed at best to fail, or at worst 
to exacerbate the problems.31 
Hanna's early call for "super law schools" for ."picked students." Hanna, supra note 
15, at 153-56. 
29. If the organization of society and the administration of that organization are 
expertly to be adapted to the profound changes in the bases of social and economic 
life resulting from the Industrial Revolution of the last century and the even more 
sweeping Technological Revolution of the present one, it is mainly to the bar that 
the community must look. 
This forward-looking suggestion was written in 1936. Simpson, supra note 17, at 
1069. Professor Simpson, in turn, noted that inquiry into the. role of the law schools in 
serving the needs of society was not at all original with him, citing several other 
significant efforts. Jd. at 1070 n.2. This is all rather depressing. The history of such 
reform efforts is traced in Currie, The Materials of Law Study (pts. 1-2), 3 J. LEGAL 
ED. 331 (1951), 8 Jd. at 1 (1955); and Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 
79 YALE L.J. 1153 (1970). 
30. Professors Reich and Marcuse both see the constraints to be products. of 
culture and consciousness. See note 7 supra. Apparently Professor Savoy agrees: 
''The real 'unliberated zones' are the interiors of our own personal lives." Savoy, 
supra note 21, at 503. 
31. Examples are legion; they include· almost every federal program undertaken 
during the last decade or two, from urban renewal to the Alliance for Progress to 
Headstart to the Vietnam war. The pattern is almost always the same: A problem 
is identified, described and characterized (often incorrectly); a variety of programs is 
developed to deal with the problem; fanfare and extravagant rhetoric (sometimes lies) 
attend the presentation of the programs to Congress; the hopes of the victims of the 
problem are raised; in some cases half measures are taken and in others the programs 
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Law schools and their faculties can play a vital direct role, by de-
fining goals, by developing, recommending, and appraising strategies, 
by removing constraints, and by assisting implementation. Indirectly, 
they can train people to perform those tasks when they leave law school. 
Developing proposals and strategies need not politicize law schools, un-
less one believes that recognizing crises and attempting to deal with them 
is, itself, a political posture. Policy-oriented legal education might suc-
ceed now, despite former failures. The reason is a real change in the 
values or "consciousness" of a significant percentage of law students.32 
III. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. Law, Science, and Policy 
The American legal realists-Holmes, Pound, Cook, Frank, 
Moore, and Llewellyn,33 just to name a distinguished few-convincingly 
shattered the naive belief that logic is, or ought to be, the life of the law. 
Although many courts and some law teachers have been slow in catching 
on, it is well established that pure logic does not decide concrete cases. 
The realists understood that there are other ingredients, such as the 
realities of life and the needs of society. Lawyers and judges were re-
ferred to historical experience, to legislative facts, as in the Brandeis 
brief, and to other disciplines which have insights about the forces of 
society--economics, sociology, and psychology.34 Until the forties, there 
fail of adoption; half-measures prove ineffective and some are canceled; victims' hopes 
are dashed and nothing remains but seething discontent and bitterness. Subsequently, 
the opponents of programs use the prior failure, inevitable as it was, to prove that new 
programs cannot succeed. 
32. Former Dean Bok of the Harvard Law School reported the results of a 1970 
poll of the first-year students in which 21 % expressed a preference for practicing civil 
rights, civil liberties, and poverty law after graduation and 100/0 expressed an interest 
in working in a corporate law firm "if time allowed for pro bono work." Bok, New 
Lawyers in Old Firms, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1971. at 31, col. 4. Dean Bok noted that 
this is a marked shift reflecting "the concern of the present student generation for social 
reform." [d. Informal discussions and personal experience suggest that this phe-
nomenon is common to most law schools. See also NEWSWEEK, May 24, 1971, at 52, 
57; ct. L. MUMFORD, THE MYTH OF THE MAClUNE-TliE PENTAGON OF POWER 
413 (1970): 
For its effective salvation mankind will need to undergo something like a 
spontaneous religious conversion: one that will replace the mechanical world 
picture with an organic world picture, and give to the human personality, as the 
highest known manifestation of life, . the precedence it now gives to its machines 
and computers. This order of change is as hard for most people to conceive as 
was the change from the classic power complex of Imperial Rome to that of 
Christianity, or, later, from supernatural medieval Christianity to the machine-
modeled ideology of the seventeenth century. But such changes have repeatedly 
occurred all through history; and under catastrophic pressure they may occur again. 
Of only one thing we may be confident. If mankind is to escape its programmed 
self-extinction the God who saves us will not descend from the machine: he 
will rise up again in the human soul. 
33. Ct. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934). 
34. See generally Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 YALE L.l. 1153 
(1970). 
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was no comprehensive guide to lead the decision maker in systemati-
cally assimilating these nonlegal materials into his decision making. 
Furthermore, the realists had not really faced the handling of value 
choices which emerge when decision making departs from pure logical 
analysis. 35 
In 1943 Professor Myres S. McDougal, a law professor, and Pro-
fessor Harold Lasswell, a social scientist, both on the Yale Law School 
faculty, took a hard look at the future of legal education.36 They ac-
curately foresaw a host of problems confmnting the post-war world. 
Moreover, they perceived the need for vast numbers of trained decision 
makers to help preserve democratic values and human dignity in the 
"booming, buzzing confusion" which was to come. They believed that 
legal education was the appropriate place to begin: 
We submit this basic proposition: if legal education in the con-
temporary world is adequately to serve the needs of a free and 
productive commonwealth, it must be conscious, efficient, and sys-
tematic training for policy-making. The proper function of our 
law schools is, in short, to contribute to the training of policy-
makers for the ever more complete achievement of the democratic 
values that constitute the professed ends of American polity. 
It should need no emphasis that the lawyer is today, even when 
not himself a "maker" of policy, the one indispensable adviser of 
every responsible policy-maker of our society-whether we speak 
of the head of a government department or agency, of the execu-
tive of a corporation or labor union, of the secretary of a trade or 
other private association, or even of the humble independent enter-
priser or professional man. As such an adviser the lawyer, when 
informing his policy-maker of what he can or cannot legally do, is, 
as policy-makers often complain, in an unassailably strategic posi-
tion to influence, if not create, policy. . . . How frequently law-
yers turn up in government-whether as legislators, executives, 
or administrators, or as judges (where they have a virtual monop-
oly)-is again a matter of common knowledge. Nor can the 
policy-making power of lawyers as executors, trust administrators, 
administrators in insolvency, and so on, be ignored. Certainly it 
would be difficult to exaggerate either the direct or indirect in-
fluence that members of the legal profession exert on the public life 
of this nation. For better or worse our decision-makers and our 
lawyers are bound together in a relation of dependence or of iden-
tity.37 
35. Id. at 1172-75. 
36. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional 
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943). See also McDougal, The 
Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Com-
munity, 56 YALE L.J. 1345 (1947). 
37. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 36, at 206,208-09 (footnotes omitted). 
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They then structured a system which described, sometimes in be-
wildering detail, how law, science, and policy could be integrated in 
scholarship and decision making to achieve human dignity, and how 
law students could be trained to operate within that system; They have 
continued to build, explain, correct, and apply their system to this day.38 
Their entire system has been described in detail elsewhere.39 Its 
essentials, however, are quite ingeniously simple and reasonable. They 
first described five intellectual tasks or skills of thought essential for 
effective policy making: First, identification of preferred policies or 
goals;40 second, examination of trends over time; third, examination of 
real-world conditions which affect decisions and are affected by them; 
fourth, prediction of future decisions in light of the conditions; and, 
finally, the development of alternatives and strategies designed bett~r 
to achieve the goals first identified. 41 
The need for pei"formirlg these tasks would be obvious to anyone 
claiming expertise in decision making. They describe nothing more than 
the factors which any rational inan would try to consider in arriving at 
even the most simple decision. Nevertheless, -law teachers and judges 
faroused almost all of their attention on only the third and fourth tasks: 
trends of decision and prediction. Worse yet; they used oIily the legal 
decisions found in appellate court opinions to deduce trends. Predic-
tions were based largely on an extension of the logic of earlier decisions.42 
38. A single work containing the complete details and rationale of their entire 
approach has yet to appear. Comprehensive examples of the application of the system 
include M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREE-
MENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, 
LAw AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (1963); McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The 
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision (pts. 1-2), 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 
403 (1967); and Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law,.44 U. So. 
CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971). _ 
39. The best short description and explanation of the system is -in Moore, Pro-
legomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. 
REV. 662 (1968). Greater detail is found in Lasswell, Toward Continuing Appraisal of 
the Impact of Law on Society, in THE LAw ScHOOL OF TOMORROW 87 (Haber & 
Cohen eds. 1968). - -
40. Many critics of Professors McDougal and Lasswell have erroneously assumed 
that, because of their concern with policychirificationand values, they seek to teach or 
impose a certain value system on law students. .Nothing could be further from- the 
truth. They do express personal preference for policies and values consistent with our 
democratic tradition. As Professor McDougal has stated, however: 
Any attempt to impose an abstract hierarchical ordering upon [individuals'] 
value demands would be as irrelevant as unreal. One function of hlw is to provide 
the procedures by which people can continuously clarify and integrate their com-
mon interests in value demands and expectations while rejecting all claims of 
special interest. 
McDougal, Remarks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASHEVILLE CONFERENCE OF LAW SCHOOL 
DEANS ON EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 125 (1965). -
41. McDougal, Lasswell & - Chen, iJumanRights and _ World Public Order: A 
Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'LL. 237, 240 (1969). See also 
Moore, supra note 39, at 672. - -
42. The judges whose reputations have survived often referred to policy consid-
erations in their opinions, but policy references were often highly general and conclu-
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Although some brilliant research was performed and some fine deci-
sions written within this limited framework, goals and relevant societal 
conditions were ignored or oversimplified. Furthermore, the research 
rarely offered alternatives founded on systematic evaluation of real world 
needs. This may be why so few of our current legal-social problems 
were anticipated by legal scholars and why viable solutions were not 
developed and implemented. 
Professors Lasswell and McDougal foresaw the need for a detailed 
inventory of the contextual factors which might prove relevant. Drawing 
on the work of the social scientists, they drew a map which identified 
features common to every social process and interaction between human 
beings. Each of these features was felt to be relevant and necessary to 
policy making and legal decision making. They ordered. these fea-
tures to reflect the way the processes themselves operated. They 
asked: Who, with what Objectives and Perspectives, with what Re-
sources, in what Situations, are using what Strategies, to seek what Out-
comes, with what Effects, in the context of what Societal Conditions? 
Who, intends that all the participants-' all those involved in the 
process and all those affected by it-be identified and described 'with 
particularity whether private persons, groups, or governmental agencies. 
Once identified, each participant's personality characteristics, social class, 
culture, interests, and crisis level were to be described. 
Objectives and perspectives; refer to a detailed examination of the 
participants' attitudes, beliefs, myths, perceptions of the world, motives, 
and demands for value as well as the levels of consciousness. at which 
such perspectives were held. 
Resources, is an inventory of participants' "base values"-.-those 
things, tangible and intangible, which people, groups, or agencies use to 
sionary. See, e.g., Chief Judge Cardozo's decision that accountants should not be held 
liable to third persons who loaned money in reliance on their negligently prepared 
financial statements: 
H liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect 
a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants 
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an inde-
terminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on ·these terms are so ex-
treme as to enkindle doubt as to whether a flaw may. 'not exist in the implication 
of a duty that exposes to these consequences. . 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,178-79,174 N.B. 441, 444 (1931). 
This, coupled with his reluctance to allow an action for negligent representation 
to swallow up the limits of tIle action of deceit, Jed him to qualify the definition of 
duty, based upon the zone of foreseeable risk, that he had developed in the Palsgral 
case. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.B. 99 (1928). A more 
careful consideration of the policy implications might have led him to consider, at least, 
the effect of his holding on lenders and sellers because lenders in a depression would 
not lend money on a financial statement they could not rely upon. . The availability 
of insurance to lenders and sellers and to accountants,and whether accountants could 
disclaim liability on the face. of the statement should also have been considered. Car-
dozo saw one problem, but he failed adequately to consider the "real world", context 
in order to determine what other effects his decision might have: Furthermore, he 
failed to consider alternatives or the policies they might serve. 
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acquire other desired things or "scope values." All such values were 
placed within eight categories acceptable to social scientists-power, 
enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude. 
Situations, is the identification of the arena of the interaction. 
When in time, where in space, and at what level of crisis? Does it take 
place in the street, in a court, a legislature, on the battlefield? Does it 
take place during a depression, a war, or in times of tranquility? 
Strategies, identifies the means used to achieve the participants' 
objectives and places those means on a persuasion-coercion continuum. 
Was the strategy one of physical force (military), economic means, face 
to face bargaining (diplomacy), or ideological (propaganda)? Did the 
strategy offer gains or threaten losses? 
Outcome, asks what specific decision or result was sought or 
achieved. For example, what did the rioters, or advocates, or negotia-
tors, achieve in this particular interaction. Were the participants' value 
demands, as earlier described, realized? 
Effects, are longer term consequences of the partioular interaction. 
How was it intended to affect, how did it affect other participants, their 
objectives and perspectives, their resources, their situations, their strate-
gies, and their outcomes? . 
The context of conditions calls for a careful examination of the 
societal conditions which affect and are affected by the process of social 
interaction which is under examination.43 
Lasswell and McDougal recommended that in performing legal 
research or decision making one should examine each of the foregoing 
elements. On first exposure, however, their system seems terribly de-
tailed and complicated. Their language, drawn heavily from the social 
sciences, seemed to be alien, jargonistic, and turgid to some lawyers, 
and was occasionally ridiculed44 and more often misunderstood.45 The 
43. A somewhat fuller exposition with examples of what is expected to be con-
sidered under this and the other headings may be seen in McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, 
supra note 41, at 241-45. 
44. See, e.g., Scafuri, Book Review, 18 VAND. L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1965). 
45. Id. See also, Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors: 
Notes on the Margins of "Professional Training in the Public Interest," 54 VA. L. REV. 
617 (1968). The principal fault of this article is in treating Professors Lasswell and 
McDougal as if they had stopped thinking in 1943. Even then, it fails to perceive 
the potentialities of the ideas expressed in 1943. For example, Professor Macaulay 
asserts that Professors Lasswell and McDougal overlooked 
the need to get a picture of the system in action . . . [and] neglect[ed] one 
[problem] which is of crucial relevance to democratic values; insofar as the legal 
system operates informally and serves to support a market for justice, there 
arises the classic contracts problem of inequality of bargaining skill and power. 
. .. Lasswell and McDougal's system of democratic values fares badly as' an 
approach to these important problems. 
Id. at 626-27. Probably nothing could be further from the truth. If their system re-
quires anything it requires an examination of the relative value positions, such as the 
relative wealth, skill, and respect of the participants, and the effects of discrepancies 
on human dignity in concrete contexts. This was clearly implied in their germinal 
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language, however, was painstakingly selected to avoid the confusion 
and ambiguity of language used for generations to obscure the real 
reasons for decisions. Moreover, it freed inquiry from a vocabulary al-
ready heavily laden with value preferences. The negative response to 
their system cast no credit on the legal profession, particularly on the 
academic lawyers who shared the response. Serious undertones of anti-
intellectualism were present in those who wrote-off the system without 
understanding it and, worse, who did not care to understand it.46 
Even those who appreciated the worth of the system as an approach 
to intelligent research and decision making might be troubled by its 
apparent ponderousness. How could anyone perform all of these tasks 
every time a problem needed solution? How could any person gather 
all of this information and assimilate it? Particularly, how could 
judges ever begin to examine all of this detail and still continue to grind 
out decisions? 
Professors Lasswell and McDougal, however, never asserted that 
every legal problem required a complete examination of all the possible 
relevant factors derived from their suggested analysis. The economics 
of research or decision making would necessarily solve that problemY 
Rather the system provides a method, in the best tradition of American 
pragmatism and democratic decision making, to raise all the questions 
which might profitably be examined. The system essentially provides 
for planned and intelligent inquiry for decision making on human af-
fairs. It resembles systems analysis and the program planning and 
budgeting approach so useful today in the development of technology 
and in business management. 48 Attention to the intellectual tasks and 
to the phase analysis of the elements of social interaction inevitably leads 
to the recognition and systematic examination of questions most signifi-
cant to the decision-making task.49 Most importantly, this approach 
article, Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 36, at 237-38, 241, 283-84. Their subse-
quent writings could not be more explicit. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, 
supra note 41. 
46. Professor Falk's critique of some of the criticisms of Lasswell and McDougal 
cannot be improved upon. See Falk, International Legal Order: Alwyn V. Freeman 
vs. Myres S. McDougal, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 66, 70-71 (1965). 
Typical of the indefensible responses to Professor Lasswell's description of the 
models of the decision process and the social process, is Professor Kalven's: "[Ilt 
did not stimulate my curiosity." He did admit, however, that his reaction might have 
been different if he had had "the opportunity to spend more time on it." Discussion 
by Harry Kalven, Jr., in THE LAW SCHOOL OF TOMORROW 159, 161 (Haber & Cohen 
eds. 1968). This is rather curious, since the model presented by Professor Lasswell, or 
earlier versions thereof, has been described in most of the writings of Lasswell and 
McDougal since 1943. 
47. See Moore, supra note 39, at 680. 
48. ld. at 672-73. ct. Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alterna-
tive Thinking and the Predictive Function, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318, 337-41 (1964). 
49. Characteristic of the Lasswell-McDougal system is that it tends to raise more 
pertinent questions than a single researcher trying to grapple with a significant legal-
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necessarily leads to the development of more, rather than less, effective 
and realistic alternatives. Pitfalls and problem areas will be found 
which, if inadequately considered, may lead to decisions which will ·un-
dermine the attainment of preferred policies or even result in catastro-
phe. 
For example, application of this analysis to the social processes 
in our cities would have yielded information sooner about the deprivation 
of the legal rights of the poor. We might have known, much earlier 
than the Kerner Commission's report,50 the extent of deprivation in 
the ghettoes, and the probable outbreak of riots and violent protests. 
We might even have developed alternatives-legal institutions and re-
forms-which could have alleviated the deprivations and staved off the 
riots. Similarly, earlier teaching of the intellectual tasks in the law 
schools might have resulted in recognition of life-threatening problems 
and conditions. Environmental pollution, automobile accidents, racism, 
urban blight, and invasions of privacy might have been noticed sooner. 
Effective solutions might even have been developed. 
B. The Response of the Law Schools 
The law, science and policy approach of Lasswell and McDougal 
could have had great utility in an effective appellate brief, in arguing 
or deciding a case, and in the practice of law generally, but the law 
schools have been slow to pick up the banner. 51 There has been, of 
course, a rapidly burgeoning interest in policy-oriented and interdisci-
plinary research. 52 Except for a loyal few who studied under Profes-
societal problem can answer within the time limitations of traditional legal research. 
This is not a valid criticism of the system, but suggests that research may have to be 
planned and coordinated in accordance with a blueprint derived from preliminary 
application of the system to a problem area to determine: that computers will be use-
ful; that research teams, rather than individuals working in isolation, might prove 
more effective in developing alternative solutions; and that, in general, a more ef-
ficient division of labor among researchers and among disciplines may be needed. 
50. THE REPORT OF· THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIvIL DISORDERS 
(1968). 
51. See MAYER 93-95. 
52. This interest has been reflected in the publication of a course book in law 
and the behavioral sciences, L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW· AND THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES (1969), and in the appearance of new law journals which specialize in the 
relationship between law and the social sciences or social action. In addition, the 
SMILE program at the University of Denver is designed to teach social science 
techniques to law teachers. See also UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, COLLEGE OF LAW AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT (1969-70). 
The Friedman and Macaulay book displays the insularity of academic lawyers. 
They recognize that "it is important to see the legal system as an integral part of the 
larger social system rather than as a set of rules, procedures and activities of officials 
sealed off and isolated from the rest of society. . . . [The law is] a social system 
with demands, responses, role players and moving parts." L. FRIEDMAN & S. 
MACAULAY, supra, at vii. The book, however, contains no excerpts from the Lass-
well-McDougal materials and, in fact, contains but one reference to an article co-
authored by Professor Lasswell. It is much like a course in world religions which 
omits Christianity. 
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sors McDougal and Lasswell at Yale, the system and its insights have 
seldom been applied to specific research projects by legal scholars 
and never been implemented as the basis for a full program of legal 
education. 53 
Of course every law teacher worthy of the title today talks about 
'policy, but policy discussions are unsatisfactory and often fatuous. The 
reason is obvious: Unless students have access to the kinds of con-
textual information required by the Lasswell-McDougal analysis, there is 
no adequate basis for discussion.' Even the first task-goal or policy 
clarification--<:annot be performed, except on the most general level, 
unless substantial information about the nature of the problem and its 
effects is known. 
Some new course books bring factual information about real-world 
conditions to the students' attention. 54 On the whole, however, most 
academic lawyers still seem to revere materials which call for the most 
rigorous-and admittedly, stimulating-intellectual gymnastics within 
the isolated gymnasium of pure legal analysis. Hart and Wechsler's 
monumental and brilliant work on federal courts and federalism55 is 
still widely regarded as the ultimate in casebooks, but it never really 
53. The Yale divisional program provided the opportunity for applying the system 
'if faculty were so disposed, but that program has been disbanded. See generally 
Freilich, The Divisional Program at Yale: An Experiment for Legal Education in 
.Depth, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 443 (1969). Columbia's abortive efforts to revise its entire 
curriculum to emphasize policy making is described in Currie, supra note 29. These 
efforts took place, for the most part, prior to the 1943 article by Lasswell and 
McDougal. 
The cooperative program at Northeastern University School of Law embraces ob-
jectives similar to those suggested by Professors Lasswell and McDougal: 
The .purpose of the Northeastern University School of Law is to train lawyers 
who can meet the challenges and obligations cast upon the profession by con-
o temporary society. The School was founded on the conviction that traditional 
legal 0 education inadequately approaches this goal, and that law schools have not 
altered their programs quickly enough to match the pace of change on the world 
and national scene. . . . 
o Even more serious is the failure of law school curricula to reflect a genuine 
concern for the urgent problems of American society.· Although our society leans 
.heavily upon lawyers for solutions ·to its social, economic and political problems, 
. the narrow training afforded by.a conventional curriculum does not equip the 
lawyer for these tasks. To a remarkable degree, the typical course of studies 
appears to be based upon the narrow assumption that most graduates seek to 
enter very large law firins where the'y are likely to work chiefly on the problems of 
large corporations and financial institutions. Large segments of the curriculum are 
devoted to these problems, and the most pressing questions of our age are either 
neglected or are examined by a handful of students in an elective seminar . . . . 
The curriculum for the School of Law is shaped in substantial measure around 
. significant issues of contemporary life, especially those which arise with increasing 
urgency in our populous metropolitan areas. 
NORTIlEASTERN UNIVERSITY ScHOOL OF LAW BULLETIN 7, 8 (1968-69). 
o 54. 0 In the torts area,. see, for example M. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES, 
.CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW.AND ALTERNATIVES (1971); C. GREGORY & H. 
KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 691~910 (2d ed. 1969). 
55. H .. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERA~ COURTS AND TIlE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(1953). 
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asks whether the division of decisional authority the authors were ex-
amining really made any significant difference to any real human be-
ings. This is not to say that the issues discussed might not be decisive 
in particular cases between live litigants, or even that they were frivo-
lous. 56 Rather, a course on the federal system seems to be the appropriate 
place to discuss whether the system-federalism and a dual system of 
courts-can effectively govern and control a modern large nation. 
If it can not, it should then discuss what, within the limits of the signifi-
cant values of federalism embodied in the Constitution, might be done 
to change it. Almost anyone can see that fifty states and a dual court 
system, carved out in simpler days, create serious contemporary prob-
lems of coordination, costs, planning, and policy implementation. Can 
we be so sure that a generation of Harvard law graduates aware of the 
problems of American federalism and perhaps committed to making it 
more efficient and workable might not have had some positive impact? 
Similarly, the core of the law school curriculum is still examining 
existing legal arrangements and analyzing the manner in which such 
arrangements are applied. For example, civil procedure casebooks have 
traditionally contained virtually no information about the effects of ex-
isting rules on live human beings, especially poor ones, and, until very 
recently, nothing about delay and injustices. 57 No course has ever really 
considered whether dual litigation in which civil and criminal law over-
lap, serves societal values, and, if not, whether there is a viable and effi-
cient alternative. Nor has any course regularly considered whether 
the all-or-nothing approach of the common law maximizes the law's 
effectiveness in serving its policies. 58 
56. Obviously, the doctrinal underpinnings of our federal system are worth exam-
ining, as are questions about whether such doctrines have been logically applied. 
57. The theory and constitutional limits of jurisdiction and service of process were 
carefully treated in most procedure casebooks. The abuses, such as "sewer service," 
however, were virtually ignored. These omissions work positive harm since the stu-
dent was frequently left with the impression that the complex doctrines he worked so 
hard to learn were working well and fairly. Even worse, the student may have de-
veloped a vested interest in the system as he learned it, no matter how unfair. 
"Taught law," said Maitland, "is tough law." See Leflar, Taught Law Is Tough Law, 
SWAYNE L. REV. 465 (1962). 
Attempting to bring contextual data into a course book presents a considerable 
problem, since the data may be extensive and new information may be developing at a 
rate which would require annual coursebook revision. This problem might be solved 
by: printing inexpensive casebook supplements, a growing practice; assigning substan-
tial outside reading, creating heavy burdens on library budgets or students' pocket-
books; or, using looseleaf course books. In any event, once the decision to examine the 
law's effect is made, the practice of relying exclusively on single volume bound text-
books will be doomed. 
58. Examining this all-or-nothing approach should go far beyond merely exploring 
the doctrine of comparative negligence. Divided verdicts might be useful for dealing 
with situations where proof does not meet current standards, or where losses, under 
current law, have to be placed on only one of two innocent parties, or where, under 
current law, an injured plaintiff is cut off from any recovery because his loss is too 
remotely connected to defendant's wrongful act. 
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Furthermore, the courses in the core curriculum continue to focus 
mainly upon the judicial process. Except for some introductory courses 
which students recognize as exceptions, most first year requirements 
deal primarily with court-made law and the judicial process. This 
bias continues throughout the three years. 
Lawyers, however, do not function only in the context of the ju-
dicial process. They are present and serving clients wherever important 
decisions, official and unofficial, are made. Recently, some of the most 
effective work done by major law firms has been in the administrative 
and legislative arenas. 
The limited scope of the educational focus may mean that most 
law graduates emerge from law school ill equipped to function effec-
tively on the unfamiliar ground of nonjudicial decision making. Fur-
thermore, excessive attention to the judicial process may have caused 
lawyers to rely too heavily on the fragile judicial system for redress of 
major societal grievances. Courts are not well-equipped to handle 
claims involving major policy implications and are vulnerable to attack 
on political grounds-when they try to do so. As a generation of civil 
rights lawyers may now be learning, significant decisions which repre-
sent hard-fought victories may be eroded or reversed when court per-
sonnelchange as a result of changes in the political winds. 59 Institu-
tional change brought about by private decision making, legislation, or 
constitutional amendment and, especially, by a change in popular per-
spective or "consciousness," may prove more durable. 
Professors Lasswell and McDougal did not place so much em-
phasis on the judicial process. Decisional processes which lawyers and 
policy makers might profitably examine take place in many arenas other 
than the appellate courtroom. 60 Law, they pointed out, includes pat-
terns of authority-the degree to which decisions are made in accordance 
with community expectations about how decisions should be made and 
who should make them-and patterns of control-the degree to which 
decisions are made effective.61 No more reason exists for law schools 
to confine their study to the authoritative decisions of appellate courts 
than there is for medical schools to limit their students' study to surgery. 
Additionally, Lasswell and McDougal described seven decisional 
functions far more sophisticated and meaningful than the traditional 
59. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971). 
60. Others agree: 
[P]eople and their interests have multiplied so greatly and their affairs have 
become so intricate that the courthouse and its processes are no longer adequate 
to accommodate the demands of a just and efficient government. Numberless 
other forums more suited to the conflicts that arise in a fast moving society have 
been 'provided. Instead of one, the lawyer now must be able to play his role on 
other stages where the issues and the members of the supporting cast are new to 
him and the script does not follow the courthouse patterns. 
Green, Law Schools: Reclamation 01 Human Resources, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 1, 3 (1968). 
61. See Moore, supra note 39, at 666-68. 
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executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative categories: (1) pro-
moting or recommending policy, (2) gathering intelligence, (3) in-
voking the application of law or policy, (4) prescribing law or policy, 
(5) applying law or policy, (6) appraising existing law or policy and 
(7) terminating law or policy. 62 In the decisional context, identifying 
the participants who actually perform each of these functions, rather 
than merely locating those who have that formal responsibility, helps 
identify the real possessors of power. Law schools did not examine 
existing legal institutions to discover how and by whom these decisional 
functions are really performed. Had they, we might have discerned long 
before Ralph Nader that groups importantly effected by decisions, such 
as consumers, had no effective role in decisional processes. Other inter-
est groups, however, were monopolizing decision functions in many areas 
of public concern. Certainly we would have learned earlier that many 
governmental agencies designed to serve important public interests were 
failing in their statutory duties. 
In the law school envisioned by Lasswell and McDougal, all deci-
sional functions and all significant strategies for achieving decisions 
would have been subject to study. Law schools would not have become 
debating societies or social science departments. Rather, such study in 
a professional school would have led inexorably to more effective skill-
training in the performance of all seven decisional functions. 
IV. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EDUCATION 
Observers have recently noted a kind of schizophrenia in law facul-
ties and law teachers. 63 Generally, the split is between the traditionalist 
views-law schools are doing what they ought to be doing and are 
doing it well-and the reformist view-law schools can and should tum 
their attention to the solution of societal and global problems. Among 
the latter, there are some who believe that law schools must become 
more specialized-that no one law school can effectively fulfill all the 
appropriate educational objectives. 64 Others feel that all law schools 
62. Id. at 671. There is nothing obscure or unrealistic about these categories. 
There are persons or institutions which have traditionally been specialists in performing 
each function. Thus, for example, lobbyists promote, investigators gather intelligence, 
grand juries invoke, legislatures prescribe, courts apply, legislatures and courts appraise 
and terminate. Using these categories to analyze the power possessed by particu-
lar legal institutions under study adds considerably to clarity of thought. See 
Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence-Gathering: An Appraisal of the Investiga-
tive Powers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 657, 705-08 
(1965). 
For fuller exposition of the definition of these terms in the context of transna-
tional law see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 38, at 113-27. 
63. See Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. 
REv. 637 (1968). 
64. See Cavers, Legal Education in Forward-Looking Perspective, LAw IN A 
CHANGING AMERICA 139 (G. Hazard ed. 1968), and Johnstone, supra note 26. 
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can and should continue to train all law students to handle broad policy 
problems and to perform traditional lawyer skills.65 These diviSions 
of opinion are not necessarily between liberals and conservatives. Fur-
thermore, some of those teachers who wish that law schools would battle 
social ills seem to accept traditional law teaching approaches. They de-
sire only to expand their own or their students'exposure to the judicial 
process, particularly in the civil liberties area.66 One thing is clear: 
despite much talk at meetings of the American Association of Law 
Schools (AALS), there is no consensus that law schools should begin to 
evaluate all of society's major decisional processes in relation to society's, 
rather than paying clients', problems. . Certainly there is not universal 
support for using the law school experience, or any part of it, to frame 
and appraise alternative strategies for solving society's problems.67 
On the other hand, there are two movements which elicit consid:.. 
erable, if not universal, approbation. One movement is toward clinical 
legal education and the other is toward interdisciplinary study and re-
search. Generally, the programs promulgated under either of these 
headings tend to be oriented toward societal problems. Law schools are 
embarking upon such programs in increasing numbers. No consistent 
educational philosophical basis for them, however, has been developed. 
In interdisciplinary study and research,' much of the activity is under-
taken to fulfill faculty research commitments, and is only loosely in-
tegrated with the curriculum. Clinical programs tend to be practice 
and exposure oriented. Scant attention is paid to educational objectives 
and, sometimes, even to adequate supervision .. 
Interest and support for clinical legal education will continue for 
a while. Support for interdisciplinary programs is likely to expand 
rapidly. As technological and economic research loses its luster, the fed-
eral government and foundations will tum to research and training in 
socio-legal and techno-legal problems .. _ Unfortunately, absent any co-
herent basis, the new education or research is likely to be haphazard, ill-
organized and unworthy of the efforts of legal educators. If so, such 
programs will not meet the need for policy-oriented training and re-
search. 
65. See, e.g., Kirby, The Teaching and Research Missions of the University Pro-
fessional School, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 523 (1971). 
66. This is particularly true of law teachers who teach in the constitutional law-
criminal justice area or who have participated in the achievement of substantial suc-
cesses in extending constitutional protections to criminal defendants through the 
courts. Perhaps these teachers should try to understand that policy problems of crimi-
nal justice are more susceptible of resolution through the courts than policy problems 
related to accidents, transportation, urban decay, and the like. . 
67. There is, however, powerful support from many highly respected leaders of 
law and legal education for law schools to face societal problems. See, e.g., THE 
LAw SCHOOL OF TOMORROW (1968); LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA (G. Hazard' ed. 
1968); and Kirby, supra note 65. See generally the extensive bibliography in Del 
Duca, Continuing Evaluation of Law School Curricula-An Initial Survey, 20 J. LEGAL 
ED. 309 (1968). . 
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The overall situation may be summarized by observing that in most 
good law schools some people are grasping for ways of making legal 
education and legal research "relevant" to the problems and needs of the 
day. Most of these people are not working within a coherent program, 
well coordinated with the goals and operations of legal education. Too 
few of us have paid adequate attention to the highly suggestive blue-
print, worked out with meticulous care and concern during the last 
twenty-eight years by Professors McDougal and Lasswell. 
V. A PROGRAM FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 
A. Developing a University Law School 
Early in this century Veblen suggested that law schools have no 
place in a university. 68 Many law schools were and still are physically 
isolated from the university campus. All too frequently their isolation 
is also intellectual. Although the law schools pass on knowledge as 
well as impart practical skills, such knowledge is frequently technical 
and concerns the operation of what appears to be a closed system. The 
oft made comparison to a trade school is not entirely inapposite; much 
of the education in most law schools comfortably fits the comparison. 
Neverthless, the proper response is clearly not to remove law 
schools from the university. Instead, in today's confused world, law 
schools should engage more deeply in the university'S most important 
function: "to identify and clarify the great issues of our time."69 This 
function requires broad examination and communication not only of 
what is, but of what might be and what ought to be. In passing on 
knowledge about legal institutions and rules, their effects must not be 
ignored. The cold eye of criticism must be turned upon them; their 
effectiveness in serving society's preferred goals and justice must be 
appraised. In the course of criticism and appraisal, as in scientific re-
search, unworkable hypotheses must be rooted out and new hypotheses 
developed and tested. As George Wald suggested to the law teachers 
at the last AALS meeting, we need a constant flow of new alternatives, 
so that we can reject existing operations and replace them with better 
ones as they appear. Otherwise, our evolutionary political and social 
system may go the way of the dinosaur. 70 
68. T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA: A MEMORANDUM ON mE 
CoNDUCT OF UNIVERSITIES BY BUSINESS MEN 211 (1918). For a summary of Veblen's 
views on legal education in the university see Geis, Thorstein Veblen on Legal Educa-
tion, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 62 (1957). 
69. Hutchins, The University Law School, in THE LAW SCHOOL OF TOMORROW 5, 
21 (Haber & Cohen eds. 1968). Ct. K. JASPERS, THE IDEA OF mE UNIVERSITY (1959); 
Simpson, The Function 0/ the University Law School, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1068 (1936); 
Smith, Legal Education and Universities, 8 U. TORONTO L.J. 3 (1949). See also the 
interesting development of views on the place of a law school in an English university 
in Stallybrass, Law in the Universities, 1 J. Soc. PUB. TEACHERS L. 157 (n.s. 1948). 
70. The same point was made in an earlier statement by Dr. Waldo Wald, The 
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This is not to suggest that university law schools become politicized. 
Their appropriate role is performing all five of the intellectual tasks de-
scribed by Professors Lasswell and McDougal and training law students 
to perform those tasks effectively. In addition, important knowledge 
discovered in the process of performing these functions must be passed 
on ~o other disciplines. If attention to all five tasks occasionally evokes 
controversy, then so be it. Better to suffer controversy than be a by-
stander to the breakdown of the social order. Only through the per-
formance of all five functions can law schools become integral and 
organic parts of their universities. 71 
B. The Interface Between Law and Other Disciplines 
Surprisingly the practically irresistible tendency toward empire 
building of most institutional administrators has been successfully re-
sisted by law school deans. The law schools have ignored myriad 
opportunities to expand their organization to carry their truths to the 
graduate and undergraduate departments and colleges of their own uni-
versities. 72 Some might argue that they had no truths to carry, although 
most law professors would rightly deny it. Instead, this phenomenon 
was attributable to arrogance, snobbism, and insecurity. The arrogance 
was precipitated by the superiority complex resulting from the rigorous 
training which went on in the law school classroom and, in the secret 
view of most law teachers, almost nowhere else. 78 The snobbism was a 
refusal to deal on a simplistic level with analytically untrained stu-
dents outside the law school as demeaning and not worthy of the talents 
of a "real" law teacher. Perhaps the snobbism also reflected the be-
lief that little occurred outside of law schools that might contribute to 
Evolution of Life and the Law, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 17 (1967). See also 
A.S. Miller, Science and Legal Education, id. at 29. A similar analogy was drawn by 
Professor Simpson, at the height of the depression. "The penalty of failure [to adapt 
society to change], in social as in biological evolution, is ultimate elimination from the 
evolutionary scene." Simpson, supra note 69, at 1069. Cf. Gossett, The Rule of 
Law or the Defiance of Law?, 55 A.B.A.J. 823 (1969). 
71. The history of earlier efforts to create a "university law school" at Columbia 
University are related in FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF 
THE ScHOOL OF LAW-COLUMBIA UNlVERSfIY 312-46 (1955). Dean Young B. Smith is 
there quoted: 
If the university law school is to perform its proper function in society, it cannot 
remain content with merely schooling its students in legal doctrine and lawyers' 
technique. • .. If the law is to be made more useful in the regulation of human 
affairs, the lawyers and the judges of the future must also acquire an understanding 
of legal phenomena, an appreciation of the social implications of rules of law, and 
a knowledge of their actual effects, which cannot be obtained from the literature 
of the law alone. 
COLUMBIA REPORTS 99 (1929). 
72. The failure to educate the general public about its legal system is also quite 
evident. 
73. See, e.g., Discussion of lerome Hall, in THE LAW SCHOOL OF TOMORROW 61 
(Haber & Cohen eds. 1968). 
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legal education. Finally, most law professors were unfamiliar with the 
work of other disciplines. Exposure to these disciplines might have 
removed the security of the closed system whose intricacies they had 
succeeded in mastering so well. 
Whatever the cause,74 most law schools have existed in splendid 
isolation from other university departments. If the law schools assume 
their proper role, there will be immense opportunity for increasing 
their participation in the life of the university. 
1. General Education in the Law at the Undergraduate 
and Graduate Levels 
Our legal system, broadly conceived, is the instrumentality for es-
tablishing and achieving our society's policy goals. Therefore, no uni-
versity graduate is properly educated, certainly not liberally educated, 
if he is not familiar with the structure and operation of our own legal 
system.75 The process of common law decision making, the adver-
sary system, and the allocation of, and constraints on, decision making 
power established by the Constitution must be understood. Law pro-
fessors understand the detailed workings and assumptions of the formal 
legal system. They, with their colleagues in history, psychology, and 
political science, bear primary responsibility for providing basic and ad-
vanced education about their own discipline to the undergraduate and 
graduate students in the university. The parallel to the obligation un-
dertaken by economics departments is striking: professional econo-
mists are trained at the graduate level, but those departments traditionally 
have also provided education in economics to nonspecialists throughout 
the university. 
2. Cross-Fertilization Between Law and Political Science 
The distrust between political science and law school faculties is 
understandable, given their divergent approaches. From the standpoint 
of the search for understanding it is incomprehensible and reprehensi-
ble. The legal system is a principal instrument of policy in our s0-
ciety; there is no clear-cut line between power and authority. Thus, the 
74. In fairness, one of the causes of the isolation of the law schools is surely the 
heavy demands put upon law teachers in teaching large numbers of law students. 
This, however, does not account for the sparsity of attempts by law schools as insti-
tutions to develop programs for interdisciplinary teaching and research and to fund 
such programs through usual university channels or through foundations and gov-
ernment. 
75. See generally Barkman, Law in the Liberal Arts: An Appraisal and a Pro-
posal tor Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1966) (contains extensive biblio-
graphy). Ct. Weissman, Law and Liberal Education, 15 VAND. L. REV. 609 (1962); 
Appel, Law as a Social Science in the Undergraduate Curriculum, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 
485 (1958). But see ON THE TEAClUNG OF LAW IN THE LmERAL ARTS CURRICULUM 
(H. Berman ed. 1956). 
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study of the theories and techniques of exercising power cannot con-
ceivably ignore the insights of law teachers-experts in the methods and 
details of performing official decision-making functions and the sub-
stance of the decisions themselves. Conversely, law teachers cannot 
train practitioners and ignore political scientists-experts in how signifi-
cant decisions are really made in our society. Their sophisticated tech-
niques for predicting and appraising decisions and developing decisional 
altem~tives-such as model building and game theory-should be stud-
ied by legal decision makers. Furthermore, political scientists studying 
the effects and operations of legal processes, such as the criminal jus-
tice system, may have much to contribute to the law school's appraisal 
function. Undoubtedly, expanded cooperation between the two disci-
plines will tend to improve the quality of the performance of both. 
3. Interrelation Between Law and Other Disciplines 
The law schools will necessarily have to draw heavily on research 
best provided by other disciplines in examining the operations and ef-
fects of the legal system and in developing and appraising alterna-
tives. 76 For example, reform of accident laws and regulations cannot 
be spun by the lawyer out 9f whole cloth. The findings of many disci-
plines including business, economics, statistics, industrial, mechanical 
and civil engineering, preventive medicine, and others engaged in the 
performance of human factors research will prove relevant and useful. 
Law teachers and law students, however, need not become creden-
tialed in other fields in order to perform the recommended tasks.77 The 
lawyer has characteristically assimilated enough information ab.out non-
legal institutions and problems to perform his client-serving task ef-
fectively. Similarly, the law teacher and his students must learn how 
to understand enough of the detail of relevant disciplines to perform 
their own research tasks. Law teachers or students should not invest 
heavy efforts in the solo performance of empirical or social science re-
search. The law schools cannot carry out all, or even a major part, of 
the necessary research without substantial assistance. Except to famil-
iarize themselves with the realities of a live situation or to gather infor-
mation other experts cannot be induced to acquire, members of the law 
faculty must work with experts in related disciplines to frame joint re-
search projects to be carried out by those familiar with research tech-
niques. In many areas much excellent and relevant research has al-
ready been completed. Law teachers need, with the assistance of tal-
76. The interdependence of law and the social sciences was diagrammed in an 
interesting way in Updegraff, The Social Sciences and the Law Curriculum, 25 ILL. 
L. REV. 743, 745 (1931). The social sciences, however, ought not to be the only disci-
plines with which the law school must interact today. Caldwell, The Intersections of 
Medicine and Law: Bases for Future Collaboration, 31 OHIO ST. L.I. 224 (1970). 
77. Others share this view. See, e.g., Green, supra note 60, at 6. 
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ented translators, the ability to communicate with experts in other 
fields. This does not necessarily require law teachers to acquire an ad-
vanced degree in another discipline, although some training in social 
science methodology might help. Specialization in another field might 
inhibit the legal researcher who may discover that he needs to draw on re-
search from many other disciplines. 
Conversely, university law schools should also provide legal edu-
cation for the specialized needs of graduate students and faculty in other 
fields. 78 Students may be sadly ignorant of the working of their own 
legal system and the laws which affect and are affected by their own 
research. Frequently, their research findings can be given effect only 
through the legal system. Current highway accident research, for ex-
ample, could lead to substantial improvement of driver-licensing sys-
tems, and to highway and automobile safety systems. Providing re-
searchers with understanding of the legal processes through which their 
research findings can be implemented could help to maximize the utility 
of such research. Conversely, understanding of the legal constraints-
such as due process requirements-may prevent unnecessary frustration 
and ward off prosposals inimical to basic rights. 
4. Legal Education for Educators and Journalists 
Education about the nature and principles of the legal system for 
would-be teachers and journalists has been largely inadequate. Schools 
of education occasionally offered courses in school law and schools of 
journalism usually provided an exposure to the law of defamation.79 
Courses and programs (such as the Nieman Fellowship at Harvard) de-
signed to portray the significant premises of our legal system-the ad-
versary system, the common law method, the organization and func-
tion of courts-have been rare. Consequently, most teachers cannot 
enlighten their students about the legal system. Journalists are often 
incapable of reporting intelligently about significant occurrences in the 
courts or about problems of the judicial process. The result, of course, 
is that understanding of the law and the need for reform of the legal 
process often remains unknown to the general population. Thus, gen-
erations of Americans have been deprived of the ability to appraise their 
own legal system, its significant decisions, the judges and lawyers who 
run it, and its effects on the population exposed to it. This ignorance 
creates unnecessary frustration, while leaving demagogues free to play 
78. In the fall of 1970 the author conducted a one quarter, three-hour inter-
disciplinary seminar in accident law. Law students and graduate students in indus-
trial engineering and other disciplines were required to work together on joint re-
search projects. The content of research papers and a student survey taken at the end 
of the seminar indicated that the students were beginning to communicate effectively 
among themselves about the details of each other's disciplines. 
79. See Elson, General Education in Law for Non-Lawyers, in LAw IN A CHANG-
ING AMERICA 183, 186-89 (G. Hazard ed. 1968). 
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on fears and frustrations and to blame the system's defects on the wrong 
institutions. 
These failures can best be remedied by having law schools provide 
fundamental education in the nature and operation of the American 
legal system to schools of journalism. The introduction of basic law 
and "how to teach law" courses into colleges of education will enable 
graduating teachers to utilize the new teaching materials which are 
rapidly coming available. so 
C. The Details of New Programs of Legal Education 
Making the law school an integral part of the university through 
the forms of education and research just suggested will not be easy or 
inexpensive. Some experimental programs are bound never to start or 
to fail if they do begin. The cost of such failures is more than balanced 
by the disastrous consequences of a continuing failure to educate policy-
trained and .oriented lawyers and law-knowledgeable citizens. The fol-
lowing are some specific programs, impressionistic ally outlined, which 
might be tried. 
1. Clinical Training for Law Students 
Most law cases are not like medical cases. Exposing law students 
to hundreds of live legal problems in a legal aid clinic is just not a feasi-
ble or economical way to educate them. Complex law suits frequently 
outlive the period of legal education. Short and simple cases, such as 
uncontested divorces and some juvenile and criminal cases, do not re-
flect the spectrum of legal-policy problems to which law students might 
profitably be exposed. Most practicing lawyers do not have the time, 
patience or ability to act as effective clinical professors to large num-
bers of law students. Economic realities at most law schools do not per-
mit the high faculty-student ratios necessary to achieve success for in-
house practice clinics of the traditional type. Furthermore, most legal 
educators agree that nonsupervised practice experiences do not provide 
adequate heuristic education. 
However, an educationally sound clinical program is conceivable.s1 
80. See, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, R. SUMMERS, & I. STARR, JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 
CRIMES & JUSTICE (1970); LmERTY UNDER LAw (Tucker, Pearson & Cutler eds. 1963); 
R. MILLER, COURTS AND THE LAw-AN INTRODUCTION TO OUR LEGAL SYSTEM (1971); 
D. OLIVER & F. NEWMANN, Tim LAwsUIT (1968); D. OLIVER & F. NEWMANN, RIGHTS 
OF THE ACCUSED (1968). 
81. The term "clinical" is used here in a very broad sense to include not only 
live litigation situations but other experiences, such as field work, internships, and ex-
posure to interdisciplinary experiences which deal with "live" societal problems and 
conflicts. See and compare the approaches and definitions in the statement and re-
ports of two law schools in CoUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY (CLEPR), CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION IN mE LAw ScHOOL CuIuuCULUM 
(1969). 
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A program could provide both practical and policy training for the stu-
dent in a particular area of the law.82 Clusters or blocks of courses would 
provide four components of the program for interested students as re-
sources and faculty became available. First, every student enrolled in 
a cluster would take prerequisite and corequisite courses, designed to 
provide the necessary substantive law and policy background. Second, 
enrolled students would be systematically exposed to the practical tech-
niques and methods of the area in question. The practicum might 
utilize parts of live cases, files of closed cases, and simulation as training 
devices for systematic and controlled education in the techniques of 
practice. 83 Third, each student would participate in a related intern-
ship outside the law school and the regular curriculum, in a federal, state, 
local governmental or public service agency, or even a lawyer's office.54 
The major purpose of the internship would be exposure to live prob-
lems. Preferably, the internship would be closely supervised by a fac-
ulty member or graduate student, and regular meetings or seminars 
would be held to discuss the problems and put them in context. Fourth, 
the student would engage in advanced course study and seminars where 
both the substantive law and the larger policy problems of his area 
would be treated. At this point education would become heavily interdis-
ciplinary, requiring the development of materials and the use of ex-
perts from outside the law school. Students would be required to en-
gage in goal clarification, examination of trends and relevant societal 
conditions, prediction of future decisions and their consequences and the 
framing and appraisal of alternatives.85 Special attention might be paid 
to planning the implementation of favored alternatives. 
In their germinal article, Professors McDougal and Lasswell stated: "It is desirable 
that at least brief periods of field experience should occur at different times." Lass-
well & McDougal, supra note 36, at 291. 
82. Compare Yale's divisional program, described in Freilich, supra note 53 with 
Jerome Frank's "clinical lawyer school." Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 
81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). Frank's proposal placed more reliance upon appren-
ticeships and teaching by social scientists than the program proposed here. Further-
more, Frank's proposal was not explicitly tied in with the Lasswell-McDougal approach. 
83. Assistance from other professionals should be sought. Client counselling, 
for example, might be taught with the assistance of psychiatrists and social workers. 
See Watson, Professionalizing the Lawyer's Role as Counselors: Risk-Taking jor Re-
wards, 1969 LAw & THE SOCIAL ORDER 17. 
If students in their internships deal with persons from different cultural back-
grounds, sensitivity training might first be conducted by experienced experts from 
appropriate disciplines, under strict controls. Ways of sensitizing students to the dy-
namics of the counselling process are suggested in Watson, id. 
84. These internships will move law schools a long distance from the earlier type 
of "legal aid" clinic, a condition which, it has been suggested, might help to make 
clinical experience "an important part of legal education." Stolz, Clinical Experience in 
American Legal Education: Why Has It Failed?, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE 
LAw SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 54, 75 (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL CON-
FERENCE SERIES No. 20) (Kitch ed. 1970). 
85. The order of the four components, whether consecutive or conctlrrent, would 
depend on a number of factors which might differ for each area of study and each 
law school. 
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Clusters might deal with poverty and racism, urban decay, the ac-
cident problem, transportation, the use of force in international relations, 
and any area or sub-area interested faculty members might deem man-
ageable. The number and nature. of the components in any cluster 
would depend on the substantive problems involved and the opportunities 
available. Practice courses in the poverty area are obviously needed 
and interships could be plentiful. In some areas where opportunities for 
litigation are scarce, such as urban mass transportation, the practice 
element might be replaced by a longer internship or greater exposure 
to' the interdisciplinary aspects of the problem. 
The educational objectives of such clusters would be twofold: First, 
students would have the basic knowledge and the minimal skills neces-
sary to work effectively in their chosen area of practice immediately upon 
graduation without close supervision or, at least, with only a short ap-
prenticeship. Graduates who plan to work in agencies or firms provid-
ing legal services to the poor, who intend to enter practice on their 
own, or who intend to join a prosecutor's staff would be especially 
benefited. Second, the practice and policy-planning skills would add 
depth and breadth to the traditional thinking skills of the lawyer. The 
ability to unscramble complex socio-Iegal problems, to utilize research 
and insights from others disciplines, and to fashion and implement al~ 
ternatives, would hopefully be transferable to any job the law graduate 
might foresee ably undertake. 
Gradual development of such programs in existing law schools can 
be achieved through the cooperation of interested faculty members and 
by coordinating the teaching of existing seminars and courses. Ini-
tially, clinical clusters might be made available only to especially inter-
ested students. If early experiments proved successful, clusters might 
ultimately be required of every law student. 
The number of courses and percentage of credit hours devoted to 
clusters might vary considerably. The ability to marshal faculty man-
power and the extent training for bar examinations is' deemed neces-
sary would limit the use of clusters. In principle, the bar exam 
should not control legal education. 86 
This multi-faceted approach is consistent with what some knowledgeable law stu-
dents have indicated they want from legal education. See Cowgill, Hoerger & Rid-
berg, Report of the Student Participants, CLINICAL EDUCATION AND TIlE LAw SCHOOL 
OF TIlE FuTuRE, supra note 84, at 29, 31-32. Some leading authorities have called 
for the same approach: 
. . Clinical programs must not be permitted to degenerate into a grandiose abdi-
cation of responsibility whereby the law school simply abandons the student during 
the third year and leaves him largely to his own devices under the guise of af-
fording him "practical experience.nIt must become a joint venture in discovery 
for the academic community where undigested chunks of reality are subjected to 
the most highly disciplined .form of intellectual scrutiny. 
Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in 
Public Interest Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1005, 1030 (1970). . 
86. It is encouraging that Harvard Law School's clinical committee has recently 
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2. Education in the Law School for Non-Law Students 
The doors of the law school must be opened to provide programs 
and opportunities in legal studies for advanced students from other disci-
plines. These might range from the auditing of a single course, which 
is probably now permitted in most law schools, to carefully planned 
programs leading to a certificate or special advanced degree.87 Artificial 
barriers, such as grading standards which penalize graduate students who 
have not been trained to read and analyze legal materials, ought to be 
removed. Pass, nonpass or even explicitly separate grading standards 
could be tailored to the purpose for which the course is being taken. 
The skills of analysis, problem solving, and advocacy demanded from a 
law student should not measure the success of a graduate student in a 
course to acquire substantive understanding of the law and legal insti-
tutions. 
Much can be gained by bringing graduate students from other 
disciplines into the law school. 88 Law students and graduate students 
can learn to communicate and are likely to discover that each discipline 
has something significant to contribute to the other. This discovery 
is particularly likely to emerge from the research seminars, advanced 
courses, and other offerings connected with the clinical programs. Con-
tact with well-motivated graduate students with different value systems 
and career goals may also dispel the parochialism and enrich the educa-
tion of law students. 
3. Legal Education Outside the Law School-A Department 
of Legal Studies 
Law teachers are already beginning' to move outside the law 
school to teach law courses in other colleges of the university.89 The 
law schools should follow and encourage this trend by assuming pri-
mary responsibility for education in the law throughout the university. 
However, the demands of professional legal training and the teaching in-
suggested that its own faculty should undertake the job of modernizing bar examina-
tion requirements to permit wider clinical training. 
87. Special degrees might include the M.A. or Ph.D. in Legal Studies. Special 
certificates might be awarded, for example, to graduate students in social work, so-
ciology or criminology, who take courses and seminars in areas such as civil procedure, 
constitutional law, criminal law and procedure, and social legislation. These programs 
will undoubtedly require new resources and special courses. Law schools, however, 
are currently having difficulty finding spaces for qualified students who intend to be-
come lawyers. Therefore initial efforts to open the doors to graduate students will 
have to be modest and opportunities will have to be limited mainly to existing courses 
and seminars which are undersubscribed by law students or in which special benefits 
may be derived from the presence of graduate students with special expertise. 
88. See note 78 supra. 
89. See Elson, supra note 79, at 186-87. See also Martin, Law for the College 
Undergraduate, the Past, the Present and a Proposal, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 459 (1968); 
Barkman, supra note 75. 
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terests of most law teachers impose insurmountable barriers to expansion 
of legal studies through existing law school structures and faculties. 
Therefore, a new structure, with new faculty, will be required. The best 
solution is the creation of a new department of legal studies within the 
law school. 90 The departmentalizing of law schools should not seem 
terribly alien. Most university law schools already consider themselves, 
in fact, and often in name, "colleges" of law. Most colleges, other than 
law schools, have several departments. 
The responsibility of the legal studies department would be to de-
velop and teach general and special courses in law and the legal system 
to undergraduate students throughout the university. Administration 
of the programs in law for graduate students suggested earlier would 
also be undertaken. The idea of one department in the university pro-
viding education in its discipline to students with other majors is ob-
viously not unique or revolutionary. 
The new department might be staffed with new facu1ty members, 
with members of the existing law faculty who opt to spend some of 
their time teaching outside the law school, and by gradually transferring 
qualified law teachers in other departments of the university into the le-
gal studies department. Except for budgetary purposes, a strict sepa-
ration between the faculty teaching professional law students and the 
members of the legal studies department should be avoided. Some 
faculty members should teach in both areas. Indeed, one of the objec-
tives of a new legal studies department is to enhance the exchange of 
ideas and perspectives between those who see themslves primarily as 
trainers of lawyers and those who consider themselves mainly social 
studies teachers or legal experts in other disciplines. 
The principle advantage of creating a legal studies department is to 
ensure the development of adequate programs of education in law and 
the legal system throughout the university. Placing the department in 
the law school provides maximum opportunity for exploiting the ex-
pertise already available in most law schools and avoiding duplication of 
administrative structures. The high standards for appointment and re-
tention of faculty and the high teaching standards of most university 
law schools would likely carry over to the new department.91 Finally, 
locating the new department in the law school would likely provide a 
cadre of law teachers who, because of their involvement with students 
and faculty in other disciplines, could contribute substantially to 
90. Ct. Martin, supra note 89, at 468: "I believe that the time has arrived for 
universities to include within their organization a full-fledged undergraduate depart-
ment of law, as is "done in some British and Canadian universities." Apparently Pro-
fessor Martin did not consider putting such a department under the aegis of the law 
college. His call for a separate department makes great sense where a university does 
not "have a law college. 
91. It follows that administrators of institutions with weak law schools oUght to 
think twice before locating the new department in the law school. 
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courses and clinical programs designed to train students in legal policy 
planning.92 
4. Other Steps 
a. Broadening course content. The clinical-interdisciplinary 
program previously suggested may begin to solve the so-called third-
year problem and will work some changes in the second-year curriculum.. 
The general assumption, h,owever, is that the first year of law school is 
satisfactory as is. As many disaffected first-year students will attest, 
this assumption may be a myth. Although not all or even most of the 
basic substantive knowledge imparted to first-year students in the tra-
ditional courses is irrelevant to the problems of society, much of the 
content seems irrelevant to many good law students. Explicit connection 
between the materials and major problems is rarely made. It is also 
scurrilous to assert that the skills of case analysis are useless or harmful 
to those who might later wish to grapple with societal problems. How-
ever, the narrow focus and the ease of case analysis, once learned, con-
dition the law student to reject or disdain the much less neat thinking re-
quired in policy analysis. 
The first year needs a deconcentration of emphasis on the judi-
cial process and appellate decisions and a more balanced approach in-
cluding attention to other decision-making agencies and processes. Fur-
thermore, the contents and commitments of recent college graduates9 :1 
might be exploited, or at least not dampened. Course materials and 
curriculums concerning societal problems and using nonlegal materials 
should enable students and faculty to engage in rational policy discus-
sion.94 The same suggestions are applicable to some of the regular 
courses in the last two years which bear heavily on societal conditions. 
Arguably it is not possible to provide the basic training in lawyer 
skills and foundational knowledge necessary for every practitioner if a 
major part of every course is the analysis of policy and nonlegal issues. 
There are several answers to this, which will not entirely satisfy law 
teachers who are enamored with current legal education or, though 
concerned, fear a depreciation of the superior aspects of the present 
system. 
92. Thus, for example, law teachers assigned to teach in the School of Social 
Work would be in a position to develop cooperation between that school and the law 
school with respect to clinical programs for poverty lawyers. Those law teachers might 
even spend some time teaching in the law school clinical program. 
93. ct. Diamant, The Liberal Arts College and Legal Education, 16 HARv. L.S. 
BULL., May, 1965, at 3. 
94. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (1971). Similar ideas are not new. In 1934, for ex-
ample, one commentator stated: "A course in transportation law might present a favor-
able field in which to familiarize the student with many of the general principles of 
tort law." Frey, Some Thoughts on Law Teaching and the Social Sciences, 82 U. PA. 
L. REV. 463, 470 (1934). 
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First, the existing curriculum obviously does not and cannot pro-
vide knowledge of all or even most of the areas and legal problems which 
practitioners deal with in their practices. Legal education has been 
heuristic, providing graduates with enough knowledge and, most im-
portantly, with sufficient skills to enable them to educate themselves 
to handle the novel legal problems confronted in practice. Additional 
problem-solving skills to enhance that competence are needed. Fur-
thermore, the change in approach suggested will not necessarily elimi-
nate an excessive amount of traditional knowledge from the curriculum. 
If important chunks of knowledge must be excluded from regular 
courses, concentrated reading courses may be substituted to fill the gaps. 
These would also meet the demand for courses to help students pass 
tradition-oriented bar examinations. 
Second, the elimination of the teaching of judge-made law is not 
advocated. Before policy alternatives can be framed for any problem 
area, it is absolutely necessary to provide students with an understanding 
of the existing system. Understanding requires large doses of case read-
ing and traditional analysis, and inevitably, the cases will be organized 
along traditional lines. What must be left out is not necessarily any 
more significant than areas which have been dropped from law school 
education or made electives as other areas assumed larger importance. 
Teachers of advanced courses may fear that important prerequisites 
to their own courses will be omitted, but reasonable accommodations 
can and ought to be made between the faculty members concerned. 
Returning to my original premise which, of course, is not shared by 
every colleague: Society requires the training of lawyers more able than 
those of the past to confront and solve policy problems. Necessity must 
become the mother of invention. If law teachers tum their attention 
to these educational problems, they can be solved. Solving them 
may be one of the most demanding intellectual problems of the age, 
entirely deserving, therefore, of the careful attention of academic law-
yers. 
b. Improving law student motivation. The carrot and stick 
and the "failure and out" approaches to evaluating students interfere 
with the development of personal motivation95 and professionalism. Al-
though a law teacher may try to create an adult-adult rapport with his 
students, he cannot avoid being perceived as a quasi-parent who is in a 
position to dispense rewards and punishments which will profoundly 
affect the student's future. Some students, especially those who come 
from deprived backgrounds where failure is common, may be inhibited 
from perceiving themselves as self-motivated professionals or from 
performing effectively at all. 
95. Cf. Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 
475-77 (1970). 
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Although allowing students to take some courses on a pass-fail 
basis may provide some opportunities for self-motivation and intellec-
tual curiosity, it is only a partial and insufficient answer. A better ap-
proach is suggested by the example of European universities: allow 
students to remain enrolled in law school for a reasonable maximum 
number of years, say six, until they pass examinations in required courses 
and meet graduation requirements by taking a required number of elec-
tives. Failure or falling below a minimum grade point average would 
not result in dismissal. Instead, the student could audit or enroll in 
the courses again and take the examinations over in later years. Alter-
nately, examinations similar to the bar examinations, covering a series of 
subjects, might be given regularly once or twice a year. Students would 
be required to pass a certain number of questions before graduating. To 
ensure that clinical programs are not ignored, a minimum of three years 
in residence might be required. Students desiring to leave the law 
school for a quarter, semester, or year to pursue another interest would 
be permitted to do so. Some students would use this opportunity to try 
out different work experiences in practice, in government, in public in-
terest work or elsewhere, or to seek other educational experiences. 
A program of this kind might also create opportunities for allowing 
promising students to enroll in law school while attending undergradu-
ate or graduate school. 96 This would enhance education for policy 
making by permitting a student to take a law school course and a 
related course from another discipline simultaneously or successively. 
c. The economics of reform. Even assuming the programs 
recommended here are worth considering, they may well be regarded as 
too costly. Funding for university programs is facing hard times, 
and foundation grants-some of which have financed innovative pro-
grams of legal education in the past-would be insufficient to permit 
more than a few schools to experiment with such programs. The pri-
mary funding agency for the programs recommended here, however~ 
is the university itself. If the appropriate role of the university law 
school is as described, the educational ventures recommended must ul-
timately be supported by the regular university budget. The current 
outlook is bleak, but we must assume that the attitude of public dis-
favor with universities is a passing phenomenon. In the interim, 
there seems to be some foundation support for internships and clinical 
experiences.97 Existing faculty members interested in pursuing the le-
gal-policy route can inexpensively coordinate their offerings with other 
96. Cf. Kilgour, Legal Education: In Favour of an Undergraduate Faculty of 
Law, 11 U. TORONTO L.J. 77 (1955),where the author favors "an enlarged bachelor 
of laws course which would operate at the undergraduate level as an alternative to the 
bachelor of arts course," and contends that "legal education, notwithstanding its pro-
fessional status, can and ought to be a liberal' education." Id. 
97. See Pincus, A Statement on CLEPR's Program in CLEPR, supra note 81, at 1-6. 
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faculty members with similar interests in related areas inside and outside 
the law school. A favorable omen is the increased interest of the Na-
tional Science Foundation in providing support for interdisciplinary 
research and study in the role of law as an instrument of policy and its 
relation to science and technology.lls 
VI. THE GREENING OF THE LAW SCHOOLS? 
To some readers the writer may seem a classical example of Charles 
Reich's Consciousness II.1l9 The writer, too, is appalled by the unre-
lenting flow of advertising, appealing to desires that cannot be ful-
filled, which creates greater and greater demand for products that are 
not needed and whose manufacture merely destroys resources, pollutes 
the air, and clutters the landscape. The corporate state may have a de-
humanizing effect on people. The elevation of status as the "new prop-
erty" has effectively removed many of our freedoms and is one of the 
major constraints on action to deal effectively with the world's problems. 
Although the writer has serious doubt whether a drug culture is consist-
ent with it, the free and unfettered life style Reich portrays and the 
humanized existence he predicts are tempting. The honesty in Con-
sciousness III is irresistible: honesty in human relations, where fa-
cades are dropped and people begin to communicate with one another 
as human beings; honesty in perception of the world around us; and es-
pecially, honesty in the recognition of the realities of our actions and 
their effects.loo 
Nevertheless, the Consciousness III Utopia will never come with-
out a substantial impetus from something other than the tendency of 
some turned-on citizens to change consciousness.101 This impetus, some 
98. At the last AALS meeting, Joseph F. Coates of the National Science Founda-
,tion's Office of Interdisciplinary Research met with law teachers "to discuss the Founda-
tion's interest in stimulating interdisciplinary research with respect to the relationship 
between the legal system and technological developmnts." According to Mr. Coates, 
the NSF is also supporting interdisciplinary teaching efforts. The Ford, Rockefeller 
and Russell Sage Foundations are also providing support for social science and legal 
research and education. 
99. C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970). 
100. As Herbert Marcuse points out, since most of Reich's commandments "from 
the Bible to Kant and beyond have graced the sermons of the moralists," it may not 
be surprising that they seem appealing. Marcuse, Charles Reich-A Negative View, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1970, at 41, col. 4. 
101. In this the author agrees with one of Professor Reich's severest critics. See 
Fried, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REV. 749 (1971). See also Marcuse, supra note 100. 
The difficulties of waiting for Consciousness III to arrive via changes of attitudes of 
Americans is nowhere more candidly, and depressingly, stated than in Professor Louis 
Jaffe's comments about Justice Douglas' Points of Rebellion in Forum: Points of 
Rebellion, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. I, 11-15 (1970). Professor Thomas Emerson's re-
marks which give credit to new values and new consciousness among youth, are some-
what more optimistic. Id at 3-7. The Greening of America, however, may not be 
Reich's entire story. See Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 
1402 (1965). . 
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think, must come from revolution-but revolution would push us all 
back into Consciousness minus I. Therefore, the only vehicle for 
achieving the values of Consciousness ill is the "system." Professor 
Reich himself applauds the actions of young lawyers who have joined 
with Nader, and others like them, to work for a better country.I02 These 
young people, he must recognize, are working within the system. The 
barriers to reform are much too strong to be eliminated without research 
and planning. How, for example, would Reich deal with the economic 
problems of a society in which production only meets genuine needs, 
where demand is curtailed, and where all people are working only at 
life-fulfilling jobs or not working at all? Moreover, the trend toward 
Consciousness lIT is not moving at equal pace throughout the world. 
Consciousness I's and IT's in other countries might not adopt his live 
and let live attitude. 
Perhaps Reich has already suggested his answers. loa Neverthe-
less the policy planning route is needed. The American law school is the 
logical place to begin to educate for planning and policy-thinking. 
The role of the university law school must be expanded to include 
education for appraising law and legal institutions, for policy planning, 
and for the extension of legal education outside the law school through 
the creation of a new law school department. The implementation of 
these recommendations in existing law schools will not be easy. Law 
teachers who have based their entire careers on a teaching methodology 
which they consider eminently superior to all others, and who believe 
that the training of legal minds for traditional law practice is a suffi-
ciently worthy objective of a law school in our kind of society, cannot be 
expected to accept a major new direction. The specter of diluting the 
strong aspects of current legal education and failing to achieve success 
in a new direction is indeed frightening. We may not have the skill or 
the know-how to examine present and future human problems and to 
train young minds to deal with them effectively. Certainly the social 
sciences, which have tried to understand human behavior and motiva-
tion, have not proved an unqualified success. Nothing in the laws of 
evolution says the human species has to survive. 
On the other hand, there is every reason to begin the experiment. 
The third year of law school is, in many instances, a disaster area.I04 
102. Nader himself seems to approve of Reich's goals for legal education. See 
Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, 54 MINN. L. REV. 493, 500 (1970). 
103. Reich's earlier call for a more "humanistic study of law" which, if given a 
liberal interpretation, is not incompatible with what has been suggested here, provides 
a vehicle whereby these questions might be studied in law schools more vigorously 
than in the past. Reich, supra note 101. 
104. It is not only the opinion of most students who have been consulted, but 
also of many eminent faculty representatives who have criticized traditional law 
school offerings (e.g. Professors Walter Gelhorn and Abraham Goldstein), that in 
terms of imparting the arts and skills of a lawyer the third year of law school is 
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Knowledgeable educators have already called for reducing the law 
sch~l experience to. two years. If we academic lawyers do not devise 
some new approaches, legislators and university administrators may 
perform the excision without consulting us. Bar associations, lawyers, 
and judges have been urging more practical education for lawyers. lOG 
Some phases of the broadened clinical program recommended will sat-
isfy that demand. Further, the change of the law degree from the LL.B. 
to the J.D., regarded by many law teachers as the height of silliness and 
status-seeking, may be an opportunity to tum at least a part of the law 
school experience into genuine graduate education worthy of university 
status.106 
Finally, for some there is no other course than to begin to provide 
legal education for policymaking. Drug abuse; environmental pollu-
tion; overpopulation; poverty and hunger; decaying cities; carnage on 
the highways; interminable and unjust war; race and class hatreds moti-
vated by seething discontent; recession and unemployment coupled 
with iriflation; unsafe streets; and perpetual threat of nuclear holocaust 
do not exhaust the list of indignities which confront us. Man may not 
be able to live in peace or with peace of mind, nor long retain the liber-
ties provided by our cherished institutions--even in a country which 
provides so many benefits in affluence and human dignity to so many 
people--in the face· of such enormous and omnipresent threats to his 
tranquility and his existence. The irony is that we are living in an age 
when, for the first time in the history of man, scientific knowledg~ 
and technology have the potential to create a world free from poverty, 
disease and hunger. In a sense, the country-and mankind-is strad-
dling the fence, waiting to be pushed either into total destruction or 
into total realization of Utopian dreams of dignity for all . 
. There is practically no choice but to try to provide lawyers, who, 
after all, run the "system," with the training, the knowledge and the 
skill to help· them to be more effective "as conceptual architects to de-
sign imaginative adaptations to head [trouble] Off."107 Thus might 
the effective brain-weight to body-weight ratio be increased. 
largely an unnecessary repetition of exercises already covered in the first and 
second years. 
ANNUAL REpORT, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAw, CuRRICULUM COMMITTEE 
(1969), in CLEPR, supra note 81, at 44. See also Speidel, A Matter of Mission, 
54 VA. L. REV. 606 (1968). 
105. See,e.g., remarks of Chief Iustice BUrger before the American Bar Associa-
tion,State of the Federal Judiciary, 91 S. Ct. # 3, at yellow page 3 (Dec. 1, 1970). 
Harum, Internship Reexamined:· A "Do" Program in Law School, 46 A.B.A.I. 713 
(1960). 
106. . Professor Reich has noted that ~'[i]n many ways the LL.B. program is under-
graduate, not graduate education." Reich, supra note 101, at 1403. 
107 .. Manning; Introduction: New Tasks for Lawyers, in LAW IN A CHANGING 
AMERICA 11 (G. Hazard ed. 1968). 
